Duelling quotes on the significance of that Iranian fuel rod:

Peter Crail of the Arms Control Association:



Olli Heinonen, Belfer Center:



I've just asked some experts, and they tend to agree more with Heinonen than Crail. And I learned something: the IR-40 has some design commonalities with Russian RBMK reactors.


So what do you think?

(Please note - this was an early post and as I investigated the issue more changed my conclusion. SSV).

On January 1, 2012 the Iranians announced they had successfully built and tested their first indigenous nuclear fuel rod with natural uranium and it was being tested in the Tehran Research reactor (isna.ir/isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1922330&Lang=E). The fuel rod is to be used in the Iranian heavy water research reactor in Arak. The advantage of the heavy water reactor is it can operate with natural uranium and can produce high quality plutonium that could be used for a weapons program if so desired.

Manufacturing nuclear fuel for reactors is not a minor task - it is a major technological achievement. It requires the manufacture of high quality steel for the cladding and welding to ensure the integrity of the fuel element. The nuclear fuel is the first critical line for the containment of fission products in a nuclear reactor. It also requires the needed uranium mined, converted into yellow cake, and then the manufacturing capability to produce to tight specifications the fuel pellets that need to fit within the fuel cladding. The performance of the fuel depends upon the manufacturing capability. It was reported that the process line for the production of the Arak reactor was completed in May of 2009 at the Fuel Fabrication Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC). Therefore it should not be too surprising that they are now manufacturing and testing one of the fuel elements in 2012.

According to ISIS the Arak heavy water reactor fuel pin is a modified RBMK fuel element (isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/doc...te_25_August2009.pdf) implying possible support from Russia in the design.

The base for Iran's nuclear capability - civilian nuclear technology was provided primarily from China and Russia throughout the 1990's and the centrifuge capability from Pakistan's Khan network. During this period and through the 2000's the US government, under both Democrat and Republican administrations, have worked to limit the transfer of technology to Iran with limited success.

Manufacturing and testing of a single fuel rod for the Arak heavy water reactor is the first step towards manufacturing of all the fuel rods and the operation of the Arak reactor. This could be a pathway to plutonium production for a weapons capability. According to the IAEA Iran had a small scale research on plutonium production from ~1989 to 1993 at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. This was discovered by the IAEA in 9/2003.

Therefore while it is still not a full operational capability the production and testing of a single fuel rod can bring Iran a technological step closer to a nuclear weapons capability if they choose that path.

I've checked out the links in Olli Heinonen's article and don't necessarily find support for his contention that

It's possible that he has additional information. But let's look at what his links say.




Fuel rod, not yet plate; natural uranium. Heinonen takes from this

The surmise that the rod is intended for the IR-40 reactor is Heinonen's.

But another interpretation is possible: that it makes sense to use the cheaper unenriched uranium for a test rod, rather than even the low-enriched uranium used at Bushehr. It is customary to test the early products of fuel fabrication; even small problems can quickly enlarge in the environment of a reactor core.

I'm not arguing for one interpretation or another; just saying that there's not only one.

Here's yet another viewpoint, from Robert Kelley, another former UN inspector.

Kelley points out that the report may not be true, as I've suggested. He also thinks that the fuel element, if it exists, is a plate suited for the TRR, not a zirconium rod filled with pellets. And if they wanted to make plutonium at Arak, they'd use yet another type of fuel element.

Bottom line: we really don't know what Iran has done from their claims. And if some of the guesses by knowledgeable people are close, there's still a long way to a nuclear weapon, if that's Iran's objective. And we don't know their intentions, either.

Summarizing: Based upon a review of AEOI reports it would appear that the fuel is NOT for the Arak HWRR reactor - but rather this is for production of fuel plates for the TRR. Therefore while manufacturing of nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor (TRR) is a technological accomplishment it does not bring them closer to a nuclear weapon capability. (Although perhaps earlier testing had begun on the Arak HWRR fuel pin - and that would be significant!)

Based upon the IAEA reports there is a chronology on the development of the fuel for both the Arak HWR and the TRR. Summarizing:

11/9/10 No equipment installed at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) for TRR fuel fabrication
3/16/11 AEOI announces plans to start production of natural UO2 for IR-40 research reactor (i.e. Arak heavy water reactor).
5/18/11 No UO2 had been produced at the UCF (Uranium conversion facility) although the process had started
5/18/11 No equipment had been installed for the conversion of the 20% enriched UF6 into U3O8 for the TRR fuel fabrication

5/31/11 Iran informs IAEA that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR for irradiation and post Irradiation analysis.
8/23/11 Iran begins to irradiate a prototype fuel rod containing UO2 that had been manufactured at FMP
10/22/11 Iran had started to install some equipment for fuel fabrication for TRR. AEOI confirms that five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 had been produced at the R&D lab at FMP for testing purposes.

Therefore going through the chronology - you might deduce that the AEOI completed fuel plates for the TRR made of natural U3O8 and placed them in the TRR reactor for testing per isna.ir/isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1922330&Lang=E.

Based upon a review of AEOI reports it would appear that the fuel is NOT for the Arak HWRR reactor - but rather this is for production of fuel plates for the TRR.

Therefore you would say that while manufacturing of nuclear fuel for a research reactor is a technological accomplishment it does not bring them closer to a nuclear weapon capability.


Exerpts and links:
From the IAEA:
REPORT 1: 25. On 9 November 2010, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at the Fuel
Manufacturing Plant and confirmed that Iran has not yet started to install equipment for TRR fuel
fabrication.28 www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-62.pdf

REPORT 2: 31. In a letter dated 16 March 2011, Iran informed the Agency that during the period 4–6 April 2011 it
intended to start the production of natural UO2 for IR-40 Reactor fuel. On 18 May 2011, the Agency carried
out a DIV at UCF and observed that, although the process to produce such UO2 had started, none had yet
been produced. The Agency also confirmed that no UF6 had been produced at UCF since 10 August 2009.
The total amount of uranium produced at UCF since March 2004, therefore, remains 371 tonnes in the form
of UF6 (some of which has been transferred to FEP and PFEP), and remains subject to Agency containment
and surveillance. During the DIV, the Agency observed that Iran had not yet begun the installation of
equipment for the conversion of the UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 for the fabrication of fuel for
TRR.35
32. On 11 May 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran had
not yet started to install equipment for TRR fuel fabrication.36
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-29.pdf
IAEA Board Report, 25 February 2011


REPORT 3: 36. Fuel Manufacturing Plant: As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran
informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR
for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and
a DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod
containing natural UO2 that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran
informed the Agency that “for the time being” it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rod
and that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR.
37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran
had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.32 During the inspection, the
Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at
FMP for testing purposes. www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf IAEA Board Report , 18 November 2011

From Bob Kelley, former IAEA inspector:

I agree with you that the irradiation experiment is likely for the TRR plate and not a zir clad UO2 pellet.
(1/11/12 email)

So I'll have to check to see if Olli agrees or not!

Or is it possible that while ISIS and others think that an RBMK fuel assembly will be used in the Arak HWRR reactor the Iranians are actually planning on using fuel plates with natural uranium? And were just looking the wrong direction? Implying they are getting close to having fuel ready for the HWRR?

The Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has once again emphasized Iran's ability to produce the fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor.

This isn't direct evidence, but it's one more suggestion that the fuel element being tested is for the TRR.

And, btw, I've summarized the discussion upthread in House Blend.

Iran has been promising some big nuclear news for the past few days. Today they released it, a potpourri of claims, of which the most specific and probably most significant is that they have loaded the Tehran Research Reactor with domestically-produced fuel plates.

What I've seen in American media is that fuel rods were placed into an unspecified reactor. The link I've given is to Mehr News, and official Iranian site.

President Ahmadinejad's statement of Iranian accomplishments.

Video of the fuel plate being lowered into...something. I'm not sure this is a reactor, so I'll ask some experts to take a look.

We lost much of the Forum and the closing out summary. But to summarize - what we have learned on this journey is that the Iranians have produced fuel plates that fit in to square fuel elements and control rods for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). These are being tested in the TRR - standard type of testing for a new manufacturing capability. It would not be surprising if they ran in to some technical issue's along the way and have to test a number of different fuel elements and control rods while they develop their process.An overview of the fuel elements, the amount of uranium, and production capability can be found at:
www.nucleardiner.com/archive/item/how-mu...eactor?category_id=6

Does Iran's production and testing of a fuel rod bring them closer to a nuclear weapon capability? Not directly - it does provide a reason to produce 20% enriched uranium which can be further enriched to weapons-grade much easily and with significantly less effort. The majority of the work is enriching uranium from natural uranium to 20% - which often seems counter intuitive. See the figure on the World Nuclear Organization site that shows SWU's versus U-235 - www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf28.html - this will show more clearly why having a stockpile of 20% enriched uranium brings you closer to weapons uranium. If the Iranian's were to move their existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium from fuel fabrication to the enrichment plant the IAEA inspectors would be able to note the transfer and this would be a red flag that could lead to a military conflict.

The ability to produce fuel elements could also help Iran if they chose to build a covert research reactor for plutonium production. This would be considered a major step and if discovered - like other nuclear facilities that were hidden until discovered by a dissident group - causes even more concern about Iran's stated goals and their actual nuclear goals.

But producing the fuel for the TRR and placing it in the TRR - that should not bring them closer to a nuclear weapon capability.

Sanctions and the reply: An Iranian lawmaker said permanent suspension of 20-percent uranium enrichment is "by no means acceptable" for Iran, but temporary suspension can be accepted conditionally, Press TV reported Sunday.

"The reality is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has no problem for negotiating this issue (halting uranium enrichment), provided that the P5+1 group, including Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany, accept to meet Iran's need for 20-percent enriched uranium," Mohammad Hassan Asferi, a member of Majlis (parliament) National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Saturday.

The lawmaker emphasized that Iran would never accept a permanent suspension of enrichment, saying that "The West should set a specific period for the suspension of enrichment. For example, they should tell Iran to suspend 20-percent enrichment for two years and then the West will meet Iran's (enriched uranium) needs. Otherwise, permanent suspension of enrichment is by no means acceptable." news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-07/08/c_131702109.htm

Iran says it has produced another "fuel assembly."

Iran is also considering building nuclear submarines. Typically, uranium for their reactors is 95% enriched - the same as uranium for weapons. I have also seen 50-60% enrichment mentioned. In any case, more than the current 20%. This could be allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but notice the qualification: to be agreed with the IAEA. Currently, Iran is disagreeing with the IAEA on a number of things.

More details here from Olli Heinonen.

It will take some time, presumably, for Iran to design these nuclear submarines. If it started higher enrichment soon, it would be hard to believe that that enrichment is for submarines ten years or so in the future. Or is this intended as a bargaining chip: remove the sanctions in return for not building submarines we weren't going to build anyway?

Some plausibility to the claim: Iran has just launched an oil tanker.

Brazil has formally initiated a nuclear submarine program, part of its justification for its enrichment program.