After sixteen hours of negotiating in Minsk, the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia have come to an agreement. The pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine have made gains on the ground since September’s Minsk agreement, and they have until Saturday night, February 15, to consolidate more. Rumors are appearing on Twitter that Russia has supplied 50 tanks and other heavy equipment.

The agreement is not fully what any side would want, but if it is adhered to, it will give Ukraine a breather to deal with its many problems and could be the basis for further negotiations to define the status of the Donbas.

Russia has some of what it wants: the gains on the ground by the separatists and a weak provision for monitoring the border. It will be able to ignore this agreement as it has last September’s. But not the fully federalized Ukraine that it has been aiming for.

The Kyiv Post has an unofficial translation of the agreement. Yevgen Vorobiev has a relatively optimistic analysis:

• Ukraine has not conceded to acknowledging DNR/LNR as legal entities: they are not cited in the text, even though Russia tried to use them as a bargaining chip;
• There is no mention of federalization in Ukraine, but there is Ukraine’s unilateral commitment to the constitutional reform;
• There’s no mention of any peace-keeping forces to be stationed in Eastern Ukraine;
• Theoretically, there’s an important mechanism of electing local authorities according the Ukrainian law (as demanded by Ukrainian negotiators), which essentially recognizes that the election held by the so-called DNR/LNR were null;
• Provisions demanded by Russia usually have a deadline, those by Ukraine often lack one;
• However, the monitoring mechanism for the implementation of this Agreement looks very weak: while the OSCE remains the only institution responsible for it, there’s little mention of the resources it can deploy beyond basic surveillance equipment.

Leonid Bershidsky is less optimistic. A great deal depends on Russia’s willingness to abide by the agreement. President Vladimir Putin has ignored previous agreements.

The New York Times has some good analysis.

Putin’s larger objective may well be to drag Europe and the United States into war. He has once again been denied that. The economic situation has to be weighing on him: the full effect of sanctions and a declining price for oil has not yet been felt in Russia. That is a ticking clock.

Ukraine faces many problems, including its own economic difficulties and corruption in government. A ceasefire will allow more attention to these problems by Kyiv. Europe and America need to be helping with them too.

Updates: Statement from US Secretary of State John Kerry.

Analysis from Steven Pifer, former US Ambassador to Ukraine.

Brian Whitmore at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Mark Galeotti, expert on Russian security forces.

Reactions from the separatists and others via The Guardian.

James Meek: What does Russia want?

More from The Guardian (February 13, 2015)

Rajan Menon and Kimberly Marten: Facing a Fragile Ceasefire

Fiona Hill: Toward a Strategy for Dealing with Russia

Mark Galeotti: Putin’s Countermove

Merle Maigre: The Estonian Experience with Hybrid Warfare

Daniel Drezner: How The West Should Respond To Putin

Anne Applebaum: The Myth of Russian Humiliation

Updates (February 14, 2015):

Long read from Der Spiegel on the negotiations and Merkel’s role

Ian Bond at the Centre for European Reform

Fred Kaplan: Economic, not military, aid to Ukraine

Photo (Alexander Lukashenka at left, Putin, Merkel, Hollande, Poroshenko left to right) from a statement by Putin after the talks.

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